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ABSTRACT 
The subject of institutions and their impact upon economic growth has been 
widely explored by a variety of literature. What has often been ignored, however, is 
the topic of how institutions arise in the first place. This paper thus takes the view that 
institutions are shaped by geography, and specifically, the agricultural sector. It is 
found that there exists some statistical and legal evidence to support such a view. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper will analyse the relationship between geography, and via its influence 
on agricultural productivity, its impact and influence upon institutions, namely in 
terms of property rights. It has long been argued that property rights have a role in 
providing security to an individual who is faced with investment decisions, and is 
therefore a deciding factor in the determinants of economic growth. This paper will 
argue that such institutions are born endogenously, via the evolution of the 
agricultural sector. Specifically, they are established in a legal context upon the 
expansion of agricultural resources, as such an expansion leads to the increased land 
values and enhanced investment potential of agricultural producers. Such phenomena 
have perpetuated repeatedly throughout human history. It is in this context that this 
paper will examine the evolution of property rights during green revolution India. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section one introduces some definitions of 
institutions for the use of this paper. Section two describes the relationship between 
geography, institutions, and economic growth, particularly the pre- historical 
establishment of agriculture and its relationship with the birth of states and 
bureaucracy. Section three examines the final stage in the establishment of property 
rights, which this paper will refer to as the synapse, and will relate this to the green 
revolution in India. The last section concludes. 
 
1. DEFINING INSTITUTIONS 
According to Greif (2006: 30), “an institution is a system of rules, beliefs, norms, 
and organizations that together generate a regularity of social behaviour… [they are] 
composed of man-made, nonphysical factors that are exogenous to each individual 
whose behaviour they influence”. Not all rules, beliefs, and norms fulfil these 
requirements, however. If a legal rule, constitutional provision, or a moral code does 
not influence the behaviour of individuals, then they cannot be considered institutions. 
Some institutions may be a structure beyond the control of the individuals whose 
behaviour they influence, and other institutions reflect the actions of these individuals 
(Greif 2006: 41).  
Institutions must also be reproduced in order to persist through time. This is what 
gives institutions their characteristic of persistence, in which the rules and beliefs that 
have guided individuals are not refuted by observed behaviour and outcomes (Greif 
2006: 161). According to Lewis (1969: 41-42), “Each new action in conformity to the 
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regularity adds to our experience of general conformity…our experience of general 
conformity in the past leads us, by the force of precedent, to expect a like conformity 
in the future…and so it goes…we’re here because we’re here because we’re here 
because we’re here. Once the process gets started, we have a metastable, self-
perpetuating system of preferences, expectations, and actions capable of persisting 
indefinitely”.  This persistence contributes to an institutional trajectory, as argued by 
Greif (2006: 187: 216), and gives some explanation why some legal frameworks, 
although inefficient in some areas of the world, persist to this day.  
The idea of property rights discussed in an institutional context was pioneered by 
North (1990) and Hayami and Ruttan (1985). Such ideas may be contributed to Adam 
Smith, in which he writes (1937: 862), “Commerce and manufacturing can seldom 
flourish long in any state which does not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in 
which the people do not feel themselves secure in the possession of their property, in 
which the faith of contracts is not supported by law, and in which the authority of the 
state is not supposed to be regularly employed in enforcing the payment of debts from 
all those who are able to pay. Commerce and manufactures, in short, can seldom 
flourish in any state in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice 
of government”. Summed up, property rights provide maximum security when and 
individual has rights to a piece of land “on a continuous basis, free from imposition or 
interference from outside sources, as well as ability to reap the benefits of labour and 
capital invested in that land, either in use or upon transfer to another holder (Place et 
al 1994: 19). Once land rights are established, according to Brasselle et al. (2002: 
374), investments in that land increase for three reasons. Firstly, there is the assurance 
effect. Tenure security increases the return on long-term land improvements and 
conservation measures, and thus farmers have a higher incentive to undertake 
investment. Secondly there is the realizability effect, which is, due to the fact that land 
is easier to sell or rent, it is thus easier to make improvements to the property, which 
in turn enhances it. Thirdly, because land titles allow the use of land as collateral, this 
allows access to credit and enables the farmer to finance investments, both in the 
short-term and the long-term. This is referred to as the collateralisation effect.  
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2. GEOGRAPHY, INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  
The steps toward the formation of property rights in an agricultural context should 
ideally be discussed in both a historical as well as a modern context. This gives some 
reasoning to why some areas of the world, due to their geographical freedoms, have 
had a ‘head start’ toward the formation of property rights, while others areas still 
struggle with bureaucratic constraints to investment.  
 
2.1 Geography and Economic Growth: Some Observed Linkages 
According to Gallup et al. (1999: 180), it has been well documented that there is a 
strong relationship between geography and economic development. Firstly, nearly all 
countries in the geographic tropics are poor, and almost all countries in the mid and 
high latitudes are rich. Furthermore, coastal countries tend to have higher levels of per 
capita GDP than that of landlocked countries. Outside of Europe, none of the current 
29 landlocked countries enjoy high incomes. With regard to population density 
(which may provide an indication of urban development and/or cumulative 
transportation costs), there is no straight forward relationship. Some densely 
populated areas are rich (such as Western Europe) whereas other densely populated 
areas are poor (such as China, India, and Indonesia). Likewise, some sparsely 
populated areas are rich (Australia and New Zealand), whereas others are poor (the 
Sahel in Africa). 
 
Figure 1: GDP Density 
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Source: Gallup et al. (1999: 227) 
 
 
When analysing the world map in terms of GDP density (calculated by GDP per 
capita multiplied by population density, measured in terms of GDP per square 
kilometre, illustrated in figure 1), it may be seen that the coastal, temperate countries 
of the northern hemisphere have the world’s highest GDP densities, of this area, the 
world’s four core economic zones of the western world (Western Europe, North East 
Asia, and the Eastern and Western seaboards of the U.S. and Canada) are located 
within it (Gallup et al. 1999: 180). Such a map is descriptive not for reflecting the 
wealth or regions per se but rather where money is. Table 1 illustrates the relationship 
between geography and some of these variables. Sub-Saharan Africa has one of the 
lowest GDP’s per capita as well having the highest percentage of land located in the 
tropics. Much of the population is landlocked (as well as only 21% of the population 
being within 100 km of a coast or an ocean navigable river. Western Europe, on the 
other hand, is located completely outside the tropics and has the highest average GDP 
per capita on the list: 89% of the population is located within 100km of a coast or an 
ocean navigable river.  
 
Table 1: Characteristics of Selected Regions (2007 Figures) 
Region Sub Saharan 
Africa 
Western 
Europe 
East 
Asia 
South 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
GDP per capita (US$) 1059 37870 2283 948 6450 
Population (millions) 800.0 324.2 1912.4 1522.0 560.6 
Land area (millions of 
sq. km) 
24 3 14 4 20 
Land in tropics (%) 91 0 30 40 73 
Population within 100 
km of coast (%) 
19 53 43 23 42 
Landlocked population 
(%) 
28 4 0 2 3 
Distance to core 
market (km) 
6237 922 3396 5744 4651 
Coastal density 
(population per sq. 
km) 
40 109 301 387 52 
Interior density 
(population per sq. 
km) 
22 125 91 287 18 
Source: Gallup et al. (1999: 183), World Bank (2009) 
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Gallup et al. (1999: 184) links the relationship between climate and the limitations 
of agricultural productivity. However, a relationship between coastal regions, and 
their role in ocean-faring trade, is also explored. It must be stated, however, that these 
figures and variables are based upon historical economic theory of trade dynamics, as 
well as that of production possibilities of temperate zones compared to that of tropical 
zones. Although not discounting such discussions, the topic of this paper is to 
investigate not the direct impact of geography upon economic growth, but to outline a 
possible indirect pathway where institutions are affected first. In order to draw this 
connection, however, a theoretical background outlining the relationship between 
institutions (namely that of property rights) and agricultural production will first be 
explored in a historical context. By exploring this historical relationship, we may then 
begin to see how institutions may be altered in a modern-day framework. The 
reasoning for this strategy will be discussed in later sections.  
 
2.2 Historical Determinants of Agricultural Production, Growth, and Institutions  
Depending on the geographical region, food production may have arisen 
completely independently (which was the case in the Fertile Crescent, China, 
Mesoamerica, the Andes, and the Eastern United States), or may have depended on 
the arrival of founder crops from other regions. Irrespective of the process, local 
peoples had a tendency of gradually phasing out their diet of wild foods, mostly due 
to population pressures and changing climates, and slowly phasing in a more 
sedentary, agricultural lifestyle (Diamond 1997: 98, 101-102, 110). 
For the geographical regions where food production had arisen independently, 
however, it was neither a discovery, nor an invention. The first people who adopted 
food production could not have been making a conscious choice or consciously 
striving toward farming as a goal, due to the fact that they had never seen farming and 
had no way of knowing what it would be like. Instead, food production evolved, and 
without awareness of their consequences. In a stepwise manner that occurred over a 
period of thousands of years, the diverse types of hunting and gathering activities 
diminished in favour of the more reliable crop foods (Diamond 1997: 105-107).  The 
reasoning for this lies with a decision process regarding time and effort. An individual 
producer may be met with the daily dilemma of either tending to their crops (which 
would predictably yield many fruits and vegetables in the future), gathering fish 
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(which would predictably yield little meat today), or hunting animals (which would 
possibly yield a lot of meat today, but more likely nothing). Humans, like all animals, 
make effort-allocation decisions by concentrating first on their favourite foods, i.e. the 
ones with the highest payoff. If these are unavailable, then they shift to less and less 
preferred foods (Diamond 1997: 107). Thus, ceteris paribus, people seek to maximise 
their return of calories, protein, etc. by seeking food that yields the most return with 
the greatest certainty in the least time and effort, while simultaneously seeking to 
minimise their risk of starvation. It has often been suggested that the first attempts at 
agriculture was in effect an insurance policy against possible starvation in the future.  
The role of technology should be mentioned here, as it not only had a role in a 
historical context of agricultural transition but also in terms of Green Revolutions 
seen today. During the time of the transition to agricultural lifestyles, agricultural 
tools such as sickles, baskets, grinding slabs, roasting techniques, and storage pits 
were developed for the exploitation of wild plants and cereals, and were in turn a 
requirement for large scale agricultural production (Diamond 1997: 111). In all, the 
end result is an “autocatalytic process”, a reverse feedback loop that accelerates itself 
from the point it begins. As the rise in population densities gave way to more people 
demanding more food, crop production became and ever more profitable and 
rewarding lifestyle. More and more of a region’s population were able to become 
sedentary, and birth spacing became shortened. Increased population growth gave 
way to more demand for crop production.  
The philosopher Jean-Jacques Rosseau speculated that states and institutions are 
formed by a rational decision that is reached when people, after calculating their self-
interest, came to the agreement that they would be better off in a state than in simpler 
societies, and thus ultimately did away with their simpler societies. However such 
evidence of state formation has been contrary to observation and historical records, 
and states have instead often formed as a result of either conquest or external pressure. 
Building on this school of thought, a related theory, often referred to as “hydraulic 
theory”, suggests that states emerged from the calculated and foreseen advantages that 
a large-scale irrigation system would bring, and any such state in turn requires a 
centralised bureaucracy in order to construct and maintain it. Similar to the arguments 
surrounding the origins of crop production, as argued above, though there was no 
such system within a thousand miles to illustrate such advantages at the time. 
However, hydraulic theory is till popular with many economists, due to the fact that 
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large scale irrigation systems began to be constructed around the time that states 
started to emerge (namely in Mesopotamia, North China, and Mexico). According to 
Diamond (1997: 283), however, hydraulic theory addresses the final stage in the 
evolution of complex societies and bureaucracies, and fails to illustrate the 
progression of political structure (from bands to tribes and chiefdoms, etc.) up until 
the prospect of large scale irrigation networks became a reality. Furthermore, small-
scale irrigation systems already existed before the rise of states. 
It has been instead argued that societal and bureaucratic complexity is intrinsically 
linked with the size of the regional population. Combined with the fact that states 
need to nourish their citizens by food production, Diamond (1997: 284-285) has 
speculated that intensive food production is the cause of population growth, which in 
turn triggers a complex society complete with ever developing political structures. 
Neither entity came first. Via means of autocatalysis, intensified food production and 
societal complexity stimulated each other. In other words, population growth leads to 
societal complexity, while societal complexity in turn leads to intensified food 
production and hence further population growth. Once a “complex society” has been 
formed, they are then capable of collectively organising public works (such as the 
above mentioned irrigation systems), long distance trade (which facilitates the 
importing of metals used for better agricultural tools), as well as the ability to 
formulate division of labour into economic specialists. Contrary to “hydraulic theory” 
as discussed above, it has been this process that has been well documented via means 
of historical records and archaeological evidence. Diamond (1997: 285) lists three 
ways in which food production contributes to the specific features of complex 
societies: 
1. Food production involves seasonally pulsed inputs of labour. When the 
harvest has been stored, the farmer’s labour becomes available for a 
centralised political authority to harness, whether in the form of building 
public works that could feed more mouths, or to undertake wars of conquest to 
form larger political entities. 
2. Food production may be organized so as to generate stored food surpluses, 
which permit economic specialization and social stratification. The surpluses 
can be used to feed all tiers of a complex society; the chiefs, and other non-
food producing specialists; and the farmers themselves, during times that they 
are drafted to construct public works. 
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3. Food production requires people to adopt sedentary living, which is a 
prerequisite for accumulation substantial possessions, developing elaborate 
technology and crafts, and constructing public works.  
Before the adoption of crops, societies tended to be relatively egalitarian, and 
lacked full time bureaucrats and hereditary chiefs. This is due to the fact that all able-
bodied people are obliged to devote the majority of their time acquiring food. 
However, according Diamond (1997: 90), “once food is stockpiled, a political elite 
can then gain control of food produced by others, assert the right of taxation, escape 
the need to feed itself, and engage full-time in political activities”. It is thus at this 
point where, during the transition to a completely sedentary lifestyle as a result of 
agricultural production, institutions, specifically in the form of property rights, have 
the opportunity to be established and take effect. The relationship between geography 
and institutions is illustrated in figure 2. 
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Figure 2: The Reverse-Feedback Loop of Geography, Agriculture, and Institutions  
 
Source: Mainly inspired by Diamond (1997: 87), with some modifications 
 
Acemoglu et al. (2001: 1369) takes the view that, “it is quite likely that rich 
economies choose or can afford better institutions”. They outline a theory of 
institutional difference among countries colonized by Europeans, and exploit this 
theory to derive a possible source of exogenous variation. The theory is as follows. 
Firstly, there were different types of colonisation policies which created different sets 
of institutions. At one extreme, European powers set up “extractive states”, which 
may be exemplified by the Belgian colonisation of the Congo. The institutions 
established in extractive states did not introduce much protection for private property, 
and did not provide checks and balances against government expropriation. This was 
due to the main purpose of the extractive state, which was to transfer as much of the 
resources of the colonised country to the coloniser. At the other extreme, many 
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Europeans migrated and settled down in a number of colonies, which are referred to 
as “New Europes”. In this case the settlers instead tried to replicate European 
institutions, with a strong emphasis on both private property rights and checks against 
government power. This occurred in areas such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada 
and the United States. Secondly, whether or not an “extractive state” or a “New 
Europe” was set up depended entirely upon the feasibility of the settlements. In places 
where the disease environment was not favourable to European settlement, the 
formation of the extractive state was more likely. Thirdly, the colonial state and 
institutions persisted in most cases well after independence (Acemoglu et al. 2001: 
1370). This concurs with the characteristic of institutional trajectories as outlined in 
section one. The mortality rates of colonisers are then used as an instrument for 
determining the type of current institutions in these countries.  
While not criticizing the effect of diseases such as Malaria had an influence on the 
settlement decisions of colonisers, or the fact that this contributed to the type of 
institutional bundle colonial powers set up during these times, Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
have taken the view that the ideal type of formal institutions are the ones created and 
introduced by European powers. Furthermore, the view that “rich economies choose 
or can afford better institutions” runs contrary to the view of this paper that such 
institutions have evolved from the primary sector and up. Rich economies have 
prospered due to the investment opportunities afforded by institutions that have grown 
out of a geographical environment, as such a geographical environment warrants their 
development. It has been documented that such “ideal” institutional bundles have 
been formally adopted and enforced in various parts of the world, rich or poor, with 
greatly differing rates of success. Such examples will be discussed later. 
Mwangi and Ostrom (2009), while criticizing the theory of  Hardin’s (1968) 
“tragedy of the commons”, point out that institutions, and especially institutions that 
involve the interaction between people and the surrounding countryside, have long 
been ingrained into human society. Hardin (1968) presumed that pastoralists sharing a 
common agricultural terrain could not establish their own rules and norms to extract 
themselves from the tragedy of overuse, and thus they could not govern themselves. 
However, Mwangi and Ostrom (2009), by using data spanning from British colonial 
rule up until today, investigate the interaction patterns of the varying governance 
institutions concerning ecology and agricultural pastures in Kenya’s Maasailand. 
They demonstrate that governance structures have long supported social and 
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ecological resilience, as well as being resilient to introduced technologies. They also 
propose that, “human decisions at all tiers are affected by the cultural values of the 
individuals involved, the resources they possess, the information they obtain, the 
incentives and disincentives they face, the internal learning and choice processes used, 
and the time horizon involved”. Furthermore, “individuals learn from their 
experiences and from culturally transmitted experiences” (Mwangi and Ostrom 2009: 
198). 
Grimm and Klasen (2008), by comparing a cross-sample of villages on the 
Indonesian Island of Sulawesi, theorise that the introduction of land titles on the micro 
level is driven my geography. They propose that the immigration to these villages is 
driven by the geographical features of these villages. The villages with a relatively 
high level of immigration in turn experience population pressure on increasingly 
scarce land resources. Increasing population density and its associated land pressure, 
as argued by Klasen and Nestman (2006), leads to conflict about the distribution of 
land, which in turn induces these village to regulate their land market and exact land 
rights, which clarify property relations and reduce tensions. These land rights in turn 
increase investments in agricultural technology, which enhances agricultural growth 
and economic development. As mentioned, the degree to which the process is 
exacerbated depends on the geographic traits of the land, specifically traits that relate 
to the agricultural return thee land provide. This may include land form (fields on 
steep slopes require much more labour input for the same return on flat fields, as well 
as being much harder to irrigate), soil quality, and rainfall (Grimm and Klasen 2008: 
4). By employing a system of nested equations and controlling for potential 
endogeneity problems and unobserved heterogeneity, Grimm and Klasen (2008) 
found strong empirical support for their hypothesis.  
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3. THE SYNAPSE 
This section will argue that the final stage in the establishment in property rights is 
brought about by the increased value of land, which in turn is caused by the 
introduction of land- augmenting technology. This is illustrated diagrammatically in 
figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: The Synapse 
 
 
3.1 The Three Sector Hypothesis 
The three sector hypothesis was first proposed by Fourastié (1954), and divides 
economies into three sectors of activity. The primary sector is mostly concerned with 
agriculture and the extraction of raw materials, the secondary sector is predominantly 
composed of manufacturing, while the tertiary sector involves the service industry. It 
is widely viewed that most countries share a common trajectory from progressing 
from an economy largely based upon the primary sector, or traditional civilizations, 
and on towards economies based predominantly on the secondary or tertiary sectors, 
known as the transitional period and tertiary civilizations respectively. This 
progression may be seen in table 2.  
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Table 2: The Three Sector Hypothesis 
Phase Traditional Civilizations Transitional Period Tertiary Civilizations 
Primary 70% 20% 10% 
Secondary 20% 50% 20% 
Tertiary 10% 30% 70% 
Source: Fourastié (1954) 
 
The majority of the world’s poor reside in rural areas and attribute the majority of 
their income from that of agriculture. Thus, as illustrated by Datt and Ravallion (1996) 
and Grim et al. (2007), sustainable income growth requires improvements in 
agricultural productivity. This is relevant for not only for populations employed 
within the agricultural sector but also for the income growth potential of regions and 
countries as a whole.  
It can be argued that an economy should ideally have a well developed primary 
sector in order to progress fully on to its transitional period. This paper takes the view 
that property rights are first established in the primary sector, while an economy is in 
its first or second phase, before such property rights evolve into the secondary or 
tertiary sectors. Thus, property rights are developed from the agricultural sector and 
up.  
 
3.2 The Clearances 
The Highland and Lowland clearances were a period of agricultural expansion in 
Scotland during the 18th and 19th centuries. They were characterised by the “clearing 
and deforestation of Scotland, as well as the eviction of incumbent tenants or crofters 
(a croft is a type of traditional farm community that relies on the sharing of land 
inputs), in order to establish pastures for sheep farming. The reasoning for this was 
due to the demand for wool (the industrial revolution was taking off during this time), 
as well as to alleviate the wide-spread hunger that resulted from the recent population 
boom in the United Kingdom. Although the clearances were a markedly bloody and 
controversial affair, it was perpetuated by a group of clan chiefs, whom acted as 
landlords to the crafting communities. These clan chiefs had a large amount of 
political connections with the Edinburgh government, which in turn was able to 
introduce property laws regarding the ownership of agricultural lands (Richards 1982). 
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It was these laws that have evolved into many forms of property law within the 
United Kingdom today, as well as having a role in the exported institutional bundles 
seen in economies throughout the developing world.  The 18th century establishment 
of property rights to clan chiefs may also explain why Britain had a ‘head start’ in 
institutional development. 
The establishment of property rights may thus be seen as a function of agricultural 
expansion. The next sections of this paper will explain this using firstly the Bardhan 
(1979) model, which analyses the effect of land- augmenting technology upon 
sharecropping, as well as discussing the results found by Brasselle et al. (2002). The 
green revolution in India will then be used in order to explain how an increased 
perception in profit, due to land- augmenting technology, contributes to the evolution 
and formation of property rights. 
 
3.3 Sharecropping and Bardhan’s (1979) Model 
Sharecropping is the sharing of a tenant’s output in some pre-assigned proportion 
between the landlord and the tenant. A rational landowner that wishes to maximise 
his/her earnings fro a land lease will always prefer a fixed rent contract as opposed to 
sharecropping. Furthermore, sharecropping leads to an undersupply of the tenant’s 
inputs (Ray 1998: 428). This is why sharecropping contracts are said to give rise to 
Marshallian inefficiency.  
Despite this inefficiency, sharecropping is nonetheless prevalent in the real world. 
Sharecropping contracts are observed primarily in Asia, where it comprises 30% of 
tenancy in Thailand, 50% in India, 60% in Indonesia, and 90% of farmed land in 
Bangladesh (Ray 1998: 419). The prevalence of sharecropping contracts, despite their 
inefficiency, is known as the Marshallian puzzle of sharecropping.  
The reason for their prevalence is due to uncertainty in agricultural production. 
When land is predominantly leased from large landowners to smaller landowners 
(which implies a relatively wealthy landlord and a relatively poor tenant), the landlord 
will have less attachment to his/her wealth than that of the tenant, and will therefore 
be less risk-averse (Ray 1998: 433). Thus, a poorer tenant will have the incentive to 
adhere to a sharecropping contract as the dividing of the final harvest irrespective of 
its size is a less risky option compared to the risks of eviction and debt as a result of 
non- payment.  
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 Bardhan (1979) sets up a model in order to analyse the impact upon a traditional 
sharecropping tenure system as a result of the introduction of land- improving factors. 
It is assumed that there are two seasons in the crop cycle. Season one, known as the 
‘lean’ season, involves land preparation, sowing, and so on. Season two involves the 
harvesting of crops. Land and labour produce “saplings” at the end of season one, and 
“saplings” and labour produce crop output at the end of season two. From a labour 
prospective, season one is when the market wage does not clear the labour market due 
to unemployment, and season two is where there is full employment and the wage rate 
is competitively determined. From the point of view of the credit market, season one 
is when the landless tenant is dependent on the landlord for credit to finance his 
subsistence consumption, and season two is when the landless tenant pays back the 
loan along with interest at the end of the harvest. Due to the fact that interest rates are 
high, the length of time for required for the amortisation of income is important. The 
landless tenant knows that as a wage labourer, he/she can receive a wage income 
immediately in season one, but as a tenant he/she has to wait until the crop is 
harvested at the end of season two. Likewise, the landlord knows that if he/she 
increases the hiring of labour in season one, he will reduce the credit needs of his 
borrowers.  
A 50:50 crop share is assumed, a rate of which has been an unchanged 
phenomenon over the past few centuries. At this 50:50 rental rate, the landlord 
decides how much land to lease out to sharecroppers. As tenants do not participate in 
this decision, a certain degree of monopoly power is exercised on behalf of the 
landlord. In terms of India, this in not an unrealistic proposition due to the presence of, 
according to Bardhan (1979: 49), “acute tenurial insecurity, heavy demographic 
pressures on the land, and a highly skewed distribution of ownership”. There is 
therefore a scenario in which the excess demand in the land-lease market at the 
conventional rental share, the land rationing of which is performed by the 
monopolistic landlord.  
Let Q(BA,L) be defined as the number of “saplings” produced at the end of season 
one, where L is labour (which is entirely hired), A is land area, and B is the land-
augmenting improvement factor, which, in the case of this paper, will reflect such 
green revolution attributes. It may also reflect the increase in the effective supply of 
land, which tends to be one of the more prominent forms of technological progress in 
the traditional agriculture of densely populated peasant economies. Land increases 
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become relevant in pre-modern land-augmenting improvement factors, such as that of 
the highland and lowland clearances in the United Kingdom. Of land area, Ā 
represents to total area owned by the landlord, and At is the land leased out. Thus, A= 
Ā-At is the remaining land available for the landlord to cultivate. Qt(BAt,Lt) is the 
number of “saplings” produced at the end of season one on the sharecropping tenant’s 
farm, where Lt is the amount of labour the sharecropper uses (Bardhan 1979: 49). 
Assuming that one unit of “saplings” produces one unit of crop harvest; the 
landlord’s income at the end of the crop cycle, Y, may be expressed as equation (1). 
 
[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) LwiiCL,BArQL,BAQwY ttt 12 11 +−++−= β       (1) 
 
The conventional, often 50:50 crop share is denoted by r, i represents the interest rate, 
w1 is the given wage rate in season one, and w2 is the competitively determined wage 
rate in season two. Β is the amount of harvesting labour used per unit of “saplings”, 
and C is the amount of subsistence consumption of the landless tenant family that is 
financed by the landlord by means of credit. It may therefore be seen that the landlord 
has three sources of income: 
1. Rental income from the leased out land 
2. Income from self-operated land, less wages paid in the two seasons 
3. Interest income 
Accordingly, the tenant’s income at the end of the crop cycle, Yt, may be expressed in 
equation (2). 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) iCQwLwiL,BAQrY tttttt −−+−++−= βµ 1111 21      (2) 
 
In season one; the wage rate w1 does not clear the labour market. In that season the 
tenant is prepared to supply (1-Lt) of wage labour, but will only expect a fraction µ of 
it to get wage employment on the landlord’s farm. The rest will be unemployed 
(Bardhan 1979: 50). 
Assuming that the landlord cannot control the tenant’s use of labour intensity per 
acre, at, he maximises his income with respect to his decision variables At and L (as 
At= (Lt at)/B, the landlord can control At, but not at). Maximising the landlord’s 
income Y with respect to these variables, we obtain equations (3) and (4). 
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From (3) and (4), and after simplification we obtain: 
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Using the equilibrium condition of full employment in season two (7): 
 
( ) ( )ttt L,BAQL,BAA ββ −=1          (7) 
 
And the standard walrasian stability condition, K: 
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Thus, an increase in the land-augmenting improvement factor, B, increases the 
equilibrium wage rate. From (9): 
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=         (10) 
 
Equation (10) suggests that we have two conflicting influences of the land-
augmenting factor on the extent of land leased out by the landlord. The second term 
on the right hand side is negative, which would suggest that the self- cultivation on 
the behalf of the landlord would be more profitable. However by doing this, the 
landlord hires labour in season two by a rate of w2. This wage rate is not a constant 
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but in fact increases, which would induce the landlord to self-cultivate less and lease 
out more land. Using equation (11), where J is the Jacobian of equation (3): 
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w
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At ββ       (11) 
 
We thus find that the latter effect, that is an increase in the leasing out of land to 
sharecroppers, dominates (Bardhan 1979: 52).  
However, (Bardhan 1979: 52) also adds that, if we were to assume that land- 
augmenting technical progress requires the purchase of inputs or services, and the 
market for which was imperfect, a different result may be obtained. This may be due 
to the landlord having better connections and access to the government subsidised 
distribution of agricultural technology, or due to landless tenants having fewer 
channels of cheap credit open to them in which to buy such inputs. As a result, the 
landlord will have a differential advantage over the tenant. It would therefore be easy 
to prove that, the larger the degree of imperfection in the market for these inputs, the 
lower is the percentage of area under tenancy (unless the landlord takes up cost-
sharing with the sharecropping tenant).  
Bardhan (1979) found conflicting results when studying the effects of land- 
augmenting factors upon India. According to the time series evidence, there is a 
decline in the incidence of tenancy along with agricultural progress. However, when 
examining the cross-sectoral data, there is evidence that the agriculturally better off 
regions have a larger proportion of area under tenancy than that of the less well off 
regions. In sum, it was found that firstly, the percentage of area under tenancy will be 
higher in areas where the land improvement is higher. Secondly, the larger the degree 
of imperfection in the market for inputs, such as that of high-yielding seeds, the lower 
the percentage of the area under tenancy. Thirdly, the larger the labour- intensity of 
the crop harvested, the higher the percentage under tenancy. Fourth, the percentage of 
area under tenancy will be smaller in areas with higher interest rates on credit. It was 
lastly found that, the larger the extent of unemployment facing landless households, 
the higher the rate of sharecropping tenancy (Bardhan 1979: 48, 53). 
The reasoning for using the Bardhan (1979) model, as well as its results, is to 
demonstrate that the increase in the demand and implementation of property rights 
may be a function of the investment and profit perceptions of the agricultural 
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producer. This paper is not about who gains property rights and the alleviation of 
poverty and inequality, but rather how property rights come about in their own right, 
irrespective of who benefits from them. There has been a wide array of literature 
demonstrating that green revolutions may have in fact a negative effect on equality, 
depending on the structure of transactions involved before their implementation. In 
the case of India, this was sharecropping. According to Knox and Agnew (1989), 
citing evidence by Schejtman (1982), Joshi (1982), Jones (1982) and Hewitt de 
Alcantara (1976), “where capital- intensive agriculture is introduced into areas with 
an uneven distribution of resources it exacerbates the condition of the rural poor by 
marginalizing subsistence systems, such as sharecropping, and encouraging the 
polarization of land control between a class of capitalist farmers on the one hand and 
the mass of the rural population on the other”. Osmani (1993) also notes the 
exacerbating effect of agricultural technology on poverty, albeit with a larger focus on 
the mechanization of labour. 
 
3.4 Profit Realization, Investment Incentives, and Legal Change 
With a higher realization of profits on behalf of the crop-producing landlord, an 
increase in investment incentives may then be realised. Brasselle et al. (2002) uses the 
following estimation equation: 
 
uXRˆ*I +++= γβα         (12) 
 
I* represents the level of investment, R is an observed variable measuring land rights, 
X is a distinct vector of exogenous variables, and u represents the uncorrelated 
residuals. Property rights were measured upon the following ten observable variables: 
1. The right to chose which crop to grow 
2. The right to put one’s land into fallow and to recultivate it once the fallow is 
over¨ 
3. The right to bring improvements to the land 
4. The right to freely dispose of crop output 
5. The right to prevent the grazing of other’s livestock 
6. The right to lend the land among traditional lines 
7. The right to give it 
8. To bequeath it 
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9. To rent it against cash 
10. The right to sell (this variable was not included in the Brasselle et al. (2002) 
study as, due to cultural and familial constraints in Burkina Faso, it is rarely 
observed) 
When studying the effect upon investment among agricultural households in Burkina 
Faso, it was found that there was a lack of the assurance effect, as discussed in section 
one of this paper. However Brasselle et al. (2002) examined the impact of introduced 
property rights upon investment variables. It may be argued that it is in fact the other 
way round, and, due to the increased realisation of profitability as found in the 
Bardhan (1979) model, the establishment of property rights are instead a result of the 
increase in investability, which in turn result from an increase in land-augmenting 
factors. 
As discussed in section two, institutions must evolve within an economy in order 
to function efficiently, as opposed to being introduced and enforced. Other authors 
have arrived at similar results to that of Brasselle et al. (2002). Besley (1995) looked 
at two regions in Ghana, and found that for only one of them land rights had a positive 
impact upon investment. Jacoby and Minten (2007) analysed the case of Madagascar, 
and again found that land title had no significant effect on plot- specific investment. 
However, Broeck et al. (2007) found that property rights had a positive impact in 
Vietnam. They found that such effects only occur if land titles are exclusive and 
provide ownership rights in addition to user rights. Property rights would be 
formalized only when the return on investment on land is high, coupled with the 
existence of collateralized lending exists. They explain that such conditions are likely 
to apply in many regions in Latin American and Asia, but less so in Sub- Saharan 
Africa, where the return on investment tends to be quite low.  
 
3.5 The Green Revolution in India 
The green revolution in India initially took off during the early 1960s, and was 
marked by the introduction of High-Yielding Varieties (HYVs) of crops, which tend 
to have a better responsiveness to plant nutrients from both soil and the action of 
sunlight though photosynthesis. This increased nutrient uptake required greater 
structural strength, which was embodied by the dwarf and semi- dwarf varieties of the 
original crop. These varieties were stockier and more robust, which allowed the 
absorption of more nutrients into the grain itself. Thus, HYV crops were characterised 
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by heavier grain clusters without ‘lodging” (i.e. collapsing) and were able to 
withstand high winds and rough treatment from human hands or machines (Pearse 
1980: 9). This led to higher yields per unit of area. Figure 4 and figure 5 illustrate the 
increases in crop yield and crop production in India from 1950-2008, respectively. 
 
Figure 4: Agricultural yields in India (Kg/Hectare) 1950-2008 
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Source: Directory of Economics and Statistics (2008) 
 
Figure 5: Agricultural production (millions of tonnes) in India, 1950-2008 
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Source: Directory of Economics and Statistics (2008) 
 
Crop yield increased form just over 500 kg per hectare to roughly 1800 kg per hectare 
from 1950 to 2008. Likewise, crop production increased from around 50 million 
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tonnes in 1950 to 225 million tonnes in 2008. This enormous expansion of 
agricultural production turned India from a country with wide-spread starvation into a 
net exporter of food. The area under agricultural production increased over this period, 
albeit at a more conservative 20% during the same time period (seen on figure 5). It 
may thus be observed that the increase in crop production was predominantly due to 
the increases in crop yields (as a result of high yielding varieties), rather than area 
expansion.  
 
Figure 5: Area under agricultural production (millions of hectares) in India, 1950-
2008 
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Gill (1989) examines the history of land reform in the Punjab (a state in northwest 
India which was one of the major sources of agricultural growth during the green 
revolution). Shortly after the partition of India, a major part of the land (roughly 48%) 
was under tenant cultivation. The majority of these tenants were tenants-at-will (those 
who have no security of tenure). Sharecropping was therefore the most prominent 
method of payment of rent, and land was concentrated in few hands. After India’s 
independence, a series of land reforms were introduced in order to encourage 
modernization. These were as follows (Gill 1989: 79), the final stages of which were 
established with the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act 1953:  
1. The abolition of intermediaries 
2. Tenancy reforms 
3. Ceiling on land holdings 
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4. The consolidation of land holdings 
However, the land reforms devised in the 1950’s and extended in later periods, that 
were initially supposed to change the obsolete land relations that were obstructing 
growth, had an opposite effect on the demographic they were supposed to help. Table 
3 shows the distribution of land tenure in Punjab in 1970-71 and 1980-81. The 
number and area of holdings that were wholly owned had actually increased over a 
ten year period, whereas the number and area of rented holdings decreased.  
 
Table 3: Percentage Distribution of Land Tenure in Punjab in 1970-71 and 1980-81 
1970-1971 1980-1981 
Number of 
Holdings 
Area of Holdings Number of 
Holdings 
Area of Holdings 
Wholly 
Owned 
Wholly 
of Partly 
Rented 
Wholly 
Owned 
Wholly 
of Partly 
Rented 
Wholly 
Owned 
Wholly 
of Partly 
Rented 
Wholly 
Owned 
Wholly 
of Partly 
Rented 
80.81 19.19 82.41 17.59 82.03 17.97 78.77 21.23 
Source: Gill (1989: 82) 
 
The Punjab Land Reforms Act 1972, which involved the collection of surplus (i.e. 
unused) land and redistributing it among landless tenants, had the opposite effect. It 
was found that these surpluses were being acquired by influential person via restricted 
auctions, and subsequently resulted in the eviction of previous tenants. It was found 
that the very elite of Punjab society that had put such land reform acts into law were 
reversing the process of land reform itself (Gill 1989: 82). Thus, once land relations 
were in tune with the new mode of production, further implementations of land 
reform had long since lost their original social significance and were instead 
instruments in providing security tenure to the original landlords themselves. It should 
be noted that, upon the implementation of land reform in the 1950’s, although 
themselves were property rights, they were not in effect institutions, as they had not 
swayed the behaviour of the society that they were originally designed to influence. 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper has argued that property rights are established via their evolution in the 
agricultural sector, which in turn is endogenous with respect to the geographical 
constraints it is situated in. Therefore, it is argued that institutions are endogenous and 
arise upon the interaction of society with the agricultural sector, specifically by means 
of population pressure. Although it has been long established that property rights are 
instrumental in promoting long-term economic growth, this may in fact be largely 
indirect, as it has been shown that the establishment of property rights as a result of 
agricultural expansion have first led to increases in inequality due to the misallocation 
of resources. More research into that area is therefore needed. However, upon 
agricultural expansion, there exist opportunities for increased profit and investment, 
and this is the key to how property rights get established in an economy. 
Many authors have long argued that institutions are exogenous, and have taken the 
view that the ideal institution is one that may be introduced into an economy, based 
on the previous successes of such institutional bundles. While such strategies have 
occasionally proved successful, it origins of such ideal institutional bundles have 
often been an ignored topic. Property rights arise as a response to the economic and 
demographic pressures, and in terms of developing economies, this occurs in the 
sector that is of the most prominence, and that is the agricultural sector. Such property 
right may then be augmented into subsequent sectors as the economy evolves along 
the three sector hypothesis. Furthermore, an economy will be generally constrained in 
evolving along this path if absences of property rights prevail.   
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